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X. Taxation
A. Gifts in Trust to Minors and the Annual Exclusion-
Crumnmey v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 82
(9th Cir. 1968).
"Perhaps the most persistent problem in applying the gift tax
law relates to the $3,000 annual exclusion per donee."1 In Crummey
v. Commissioner2 the Ninth Circuit joins other courts in struggling
with one aspect of the problem-the annual exclusion as applied to
gifts in trust to minors.3
In Crummey the taxpayers created an irrevocable, inter vivos
accumulation trust for the benefit of their four children. The per-
tinent provision of the trust was the demand provision which per-
mitted the children to demand and receive a maximum of $4,000 in
any year in which a gift was made to the trust.4 This provision was
1 M. CHIRELSTEIn, L. DAY & E. OwENs, TAXATION iN THE UNITED STATES
256 (1963).
2 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cr. 1968), af-fg 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 772 (1966).
3 Congress examined the subject of gifts in trust to minors in the 1950's.
This examination resulted in the addition of section 2503 (c) to the Internal
Revenue Code. This section provides a method by which the taxpayer may
make such a gift and still receive the annual exclusion. If the income and
corpus may be used for the minor's benefit prior to his majority, if the trust
will terminate when the minor attains the age of 21, and if the corpus must
pass to him or his estate or as he shall appoint under a general power of
appointment, then the annual exclusion is allowed the donor. In adding this
section Congress noted that "[g]ifts to minors are often hindered by the fact
that it is not clear how such a gift can be made in trust ... other than as a
future interest." S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 127 (1954).
The Internal Revenue Service has stated that this provision is not to be
considered as the exclusive method for giving gifts in trust to minors and the
residual complexities which arose under the old law remain. Treas. Reg.
§ 25-2503-4(c) (1958). Therefore, a donor who does not choose to comply
with the new provisions may still attempt to give a gift of a present interest
under the pre-1954 law and thereby obtain an annual exclusion as provided
by the Code. Many donors, however, will prefer to avail themselves of the
new section, because, if it is strictly complied with, it is immaterial whether
the gift is of a present or a future interest. See generally C. LOWNDES & R.
KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXEs § 33.10-.11 (2d ed. 1962); 5 3. M aTENs,
LAW OF FEDERAL GnT AND ESTATE TAXATION, §§ 38.01-.38 (1959); Caplin, How
to Treat Gifts to Minors, N.Y.U. 13TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 193 (1955); Ehrlich,
Tax Aspects of Gifts to Minors, 46 MAss. L.Q. 310 (1961); Louthan, Trusts for
Minors, TRUST BULL., Oct. 1955, at 24.
4 The instrument provided that the trustee could receive additions to
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inserted in order to create a gift of a present interest and to secure,
therefore, the benefit of the annual exclusion to the donors.5 Gifts
were made to the trust in two successive years; in the first year one
of the four children was an adult, and in the second year two of the
four were adults. Under the gift-splitting provisions of the Code
the taxpayers each claimed an annual exclusion of $3,000 for each
donee.6 The Commissioner determined a deficiency in the gift tax
payable for each year in question on the ground that only those gifts
made to adult beneficiaries were of present interests.7
The Tax Court s held that the gifts to the two youngest donees
were of future interests, relying on Stifel v. Commissioner9 wherein
the trust corpus in any year and that "[w]ith respect to such additions, each
child of the Trustors may demand at any time (up to and including December
31 of the year in which a transfer to his or her Trust has been made) the
sum of Four Thousand Dollars ($4,000.00) or the amount of the transfer from
each donor, whichever is less, payable in cash immediately upon receipt by
the Trustee of the demand in writing and in any event, not later than De-
cember 31 in the year in which such transfer was made. Such payment
shall be made from the gift of that donor for that year. If a child is a minor
at the time of such gift of that donor for that year, or fails in legal capacity for
any reason, the child's guardian may make such demand on behalf of the
child. The property received pursuant to the demand shall be held by the
guardian for benefit and use of the child." 397 F.2d at 83 (emphasis of court
deleted). This particular demand provision is novel. The demand provision
in question has not been so limited in prior cases. In those cases the demand
could be made by the beneficiary at any time, and it did not expire as it did
in the instant case. See, e.g., the demand clause in John W. Kieckhefer, 15
T.C. 111 (1950), note 30 infra.
5 "In the case of gifts (other than gifts of future interests in property)
made to any person by the donor during the calendar year ... the first
$3,000 of such gifts to such person shall not ... be included in the total
amount of gifts made during such year" for purposes of the gift tax. INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954, § 2503 (b).
6 INT. REV. CODE or 1954, § 2513 (a) provides that a gift by one spouse
may be treated as being made one half by each for gift tax purposes. In
Helvering v. Hutchings, 322 U.S. 393, 396-97 (1941), it was held that the
beneficiary of a trust and not the trustee is the donee under the statutory
phrase "any person." Int. Rev. Code of 1932, § 504(b), 47 Stat. 247 (now INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2503(b)). As a result, the donor can receive a $3,000
exclusion ($5,000 at the time of Helvering v. Hutchings) for each donee and
take advantage of the provision in each year in which a gift to the trust is
made.
7 Definitions of present and future interests are found in the regula-
tions as follows:
a) "' Future interests' is a legal term ... [denoting interests] which are
limited to commence in use, possession or enjoyment at some future date or
time." Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3(a) (1958). See generally Note, Taxation-Gift
Taxes-Gift in Trust for Minor is Present Interest if Beneficiary or Legal
Guardian May Demand Immediate Termination, 65 HARv. L. REV. 703 (1952).
s D. Clifford Crummey, 25 CCH Tax. Ct. Mem. 772 (1966).
9 197 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1952), rev'g 17 T.C. 647 (1951). See text ac-
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it was held that in the absence of an appointment of a guardian there
was no one who could make an effective demand since the minors
were under legal disabilities. It was conceded that the gifts to the
adults were of a present interest.1 ° An exclusion was allowed for the
minor who was 20 years old at the time of the first gift on the theory
that under state law she could make an effective demand."
The court of appeals reversed the Tax Court in an exhaustive
opinion.12 As the taxpayers in Crummey did not comply with the
new Code provisions, 3 it was imperative that the gifts be deemed to
be of a present interest to qualify for the annual exclusion. The
court of appeals held the gifts to all donees to be of present interests,
including those made to minor beneficiaries. 14 The basis of this
conclusion was the application of an objective test for the deter-
mination of whether the gifts were of present or future interests.
The court stated that the test should seek to determine whether the
minor beneficiary received present legal and technical rights under
the trust instrument, with the inquiry directed to the trust document
and the laws of the jurisdiction as to minors. Considerations of a sub-
jective nature, such as the probability of a demand being made, should
not be entertained.15
The court's position in Crummey was an attempt to resolve
a conflict in earlier cases which sought to determine the status
of gifts for tax exclusion purposes.16 Congress enacted the fu-
ture interest exception because it "apprehended [the] difficulty, in
many instances, of determining the number of eventual donees and
the values of their respective gifts."'17 The courts did not restrict,
the application of the rule to such difficult situations, however, but
denied the exclusion with regard to all gifts which were classified
companying notes 44-48 infra.
10 D. Clifford Crummey, 25 CCH Tax. Ct. Mem. 772, 773 (1966).
11 Id. at 774-75. The court thought that in California a minor over the
age of 18 was accorded sufficient additional legal rights to make an effective
demand. The court relied on Civil Code section 33 which provides that "[a]
minor cannot... under the age of eighteen, make a contract relating to real
property, or any interest therein.. . ." CAL. Civ. CODE § 33.
12 Crummey v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968).
13 See note 3 supra.
14 Crummey v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 82, 88 (9th Cir. 1968).
15 Id.
16 Some writers have felt that the problem does not deserve as much
attention as has been given it. "Excessive preoccupation of taxpayers and
their counsel with the annual $3,000 gift tax exclusion for gifts to minors
makes John W. Kieskhefer, Kieckhefer v. Commissioner, and Arthur C. Stifel
Jr. interesting quite out of proportion to their true significance." Rogers,
Stifel Stifles Kieckhefer, 7 TAx. L. REv. 500 (1952).
17 H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1932).
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as future interests.18 Therefore, taxpayers were required to tailor
their gifts to the Code and the existing judicial interpretations
thereof to obtain an annual exclusion. As the statutes and deci-
sions were rather uncertain, this was a difficult proposition. 19 The
most difficult problems have been encountered in connection with
gifts in trust to minors.
20
It is now agreed that absolute, unrestricted ownership and
possession, once conveyed, creates a present interest in the donee.
When less than this absolute ownership has been transmitted, the
search has been for an equivalent of ownership. 21 If such equivalent
is not found, the gift is deemed to be of a future interest and the
annual exclusion is denied.
22
An examination of the earlier judicial applications of the future
interest rule to trusts containing demand provisions illuminates the
importance of the Crummey decision in establishing an overall test
for ascertaining the equivalence of ownership necessary to estab-
lish a present interest for tax exclusion purposes.
18 See, e.g., Fondren v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 18 (1945).
19 It was not disputed that a gift in hand to an adult was a gift of a
present interest. There was some initial conflict as to whether a gift in trust
to an adult was a gift of a present interest. Between the years 1939 and 1943
the statute disallowed any exclusion for a gift in trust. Revenue Act of 1934,
§ 505(a), 52 Stat. 565. The annual exclusion was restored for such gifts in
1943. Revenue Act of 1942, § 454, 56 Stat. 953 (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 2503(b) ). The treasury now concedes that a gift in trust for the benefit
of an adult donee may be a gift of a present interest. Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-2
(1958).
The status of gifts to minors is yet to be completely resolved. Initially
there were some authorities who disputed that even an outright gift to a
minor would constitute a present interest. Fleming, A Different View of Out-
right Gifts to Minors, 7 TAx. L. REv. 89 (1951); Fleming, Gifts for the Ben-
efit of Minors, 49 MicH. L. REv. 529 (1951). Other writers regarded the ques-
tion as unsettled. Anderson, Gifts to Children and Incompetents, 26 TAXES
911 (1948); Diamond, Tops and Dolls--or Gifts to Minors, 30 TAXES 987 (1952).
While it has not been litigated, the question appears to have been resolved in
favor of the minor. It is now agreed that a gift directly to a minor's legal
guardian can be of a present interest. Rev. Rul. 54-400, 1954--2 Cum. BULL.
319.
20 "Almost in vain, the donors sought for a magic formula for making
a gift in trust, particularly for the benefit of minors, which would pass the
'future interest' hurdle and at the same time avoid the donor's natural reluc-
tance to vest full control of the property and the income in immature and
inexperienced donees." Lentz, Drafting a 2503(c) Trust for a Minor, 38 DicTA
11, 12 (1961).
21 "[A] present power of disposition for one's own benefit is the equiv-
%lent of ownership .... " Ryerson v. United States, 312 U.S. 405, 408 (1941).
22 See note 5 supra.
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Historical Development
In Fondren v. Commissioner2 3 the Supreme Court drew a defi-
nition of the term "present interest" for purposes of the gift tax.
The trust in that case did not include a demand provision. The trustee
was given a discretionary power of invasion to be exercised whenever
the circumstances of the beneficiary warranted. The Court noted
that the parents of the beneficiary were of ample means and that it
was improbable that the trustee would be required to distribute
to the beneficiary.
The Court held the gift to be one of a future interest saying,
"[t]he question is of time, not when title vests, but when enjoy-
ment begins. '24 It was indicated that a gift is not of a present in-
terest if any circumstances operate to restrict the donee's ability
presently to enjoy the gift.25 In defining a present interest the Court
said, "he must have the right presently to use, possess or enjoy the
property."26  Further, "[t]he important thing is the certainty of
postponement, not certainty of the length of its duration."2 7  The
Court said that the question is essentially one of when enjoyment is
to begin.
It is clear that the Supreme Court in Fondren was attempting to
delineate one concept. In any given situation, if there is a certainty of
postponed enjoyment, there must of necessity be restrictions on the
donee's present ability to enjoy the property, and, consequently, there
would be no present right of enjoyment. Barriers would then exist
between the donee's right of enjoyment and the gift. It is sub-
mitted, however, that the courts which had occasion to apply the
Fondren concept did not understand that there was a latent ambiguity
in the Court's definition and test. It was not indicated by the lan-
guage of the Court as applied to the facts of the case whether the
Court was proposing an objective or a subjective test or some combi-
nation of the two. The language of the Court is subject to two
23 324 U.S. 18 (1945).
24 Id. at 20.
25 "WThatever puts the barrier of a substantial period between the will
of the beneficiary or donee now to enjoy what has been given him and that
enjoyment makes the gift one of a future interest within the meaning of the
regulation." Id. at 20-21 (dictum).
26 Id. (emphasis added). It has not been contended by the treasury
that a donee must take actual physical possession and then make actual use of
the donated property in order for the gift to be of a present interest. It is
sufficient that he have the unrestricted right to use the property whenever
he shall so determine.
27 Id. at 26. On the facts of the case the court held the gifts to be of
a future interest on the theory that the power of invasion being discretionary
with the trustee rendered the gift contingent on the exercise of that discretion.
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possible interpretations: (1) in order to find a gift of a present in-
terest it is necessary that there be an absence of legal restrictions on
the donee's ability to enjoy the property; (2) in order to find a gift
of a present interest there must be an absence of legal restrictions
coupled with restrictions in fact which operate to cause postponed
enjoyment.
28
Apparently, no court has noticed that the definition and test
were ambiguous. Each court has seen at least one aspect of the con-
cept and has proceeded to derive its own test. Due respect was paid
to the Fondren language, and apparently the courts were convinced
that they were conforming with the concept identified by the Supreme
Court.
The Kieckhefer Decisions
The first court to apply the Fondren test to a trust containing a
demand provision was the Tax Court in John W. Kieckhefer.29 The
donor had established an accumulation trust for his newborn grand-
son. The trustee was granted a discretionary power of invasion as in
Fondren, but a demand provision was also included in an attempt to
make the gift one of a present interest.80 The court held the gift to
be one of a future interest, relying on the postponement of enjoy-
ment language in Fondren.31 The holding was that an infant could
not make an effective damand due to his natural and legal disabilities
and that, in the absence of the appointment of a legal guardian,
there was no one who could exercise the demand power.
32
The Seventh Circuit reversed the Tax Court, holding that the
demand provision did indeed create a present interest in the donee.
33
Also relying on Fondren, Chief Judge Major said, "[i]t is not, how-
ever, the use, possession or enjoyment . . . [of the property], but
28 For example, it may be necessary to consider the age of the donee to
determine whether he has the physical capacity to make an effective demand.
29 15 T.C. 111 (1950), aff'd, 189 F.2d 118 (7th Cir. 1951).
30 "The beneficiary shall be entitled to all or any part of the trust estate
or to terminate the trust estate in whole or in part at any time whenever said
[beneficiary] or the legally appointed guardian for his estate shall make due
demand therefore .... " Id. at 113.
31 The court said, "[w]e have no doubt that the intent of the [donor]
... was to provide some estate for his grandson at the age of 21, subject,
however, to a contingent but unanticipated need in the interval." Id. at 115.
32 In this case the court noted both the natdral and legal disabilities of
the minor. "Certainly no one could convincingly contend that an infant of six
months was capable of making effective demand for any part of the estate,
whether in writing or otherwise, and the situation would, we think, be the
same even if we should assume a minor two, four, six, eight, ten, or more
years older than the beneficiary in this case." Id. at 115-16.
3 Kieckhefer v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 118 (7th Cir. 1951).
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it is the right conferred upon the beneficiary to such use, possession
or enjoyment"34 which distinguishes a present interest from a future
one. The Tax Court had noted the disability of the minor and its
considered effect on his right to make an effective demand. The
court of appeals noted that a provision in a similar accumulation
trust for the benefit of an adult would create a gift of a present
interest. The appellate court did not think that Congress intended
discrimination between minors and adults with regard to the appli-
cation of the gift tax, and, accordingly, held the gift to be one of a
present interest.3 5
Fondren was distinguished by the appellate court as involving
"trust agreements which by their terms contained the restrictions
and conditions which led the Court to decide that the gifts were of a
future interest."3 6 The court of appeals further reasoned that the
decision in Fondren was based on the contingency of need ever
arising and that this contingency was imposed by the trust instrument.
In Kieckhefer the restriction was not imposed by the trust instru-
ment, but by state law involving the consequent disabilities of mi-
nority.3 7 Ostensibly, the court- was concerned that a decision sus-
taining the Commissioner's position would have a deleterious effect
on the frequency of gifts being made in trust to minors.8  The court
must have thought that it was necessary to hold the gift to be one
of a present interest in order to encourage such gifts. The holding
was that where restrictions on the gift were not imposed by the donor,
but were imposed by state law, such restrictions should be dis-
regarded; and if the gift would otherwise be one of a present in-
terest, that determination should not be changed by the mere fact that
the donee was a minor.3 9
34 Id. at 121 (emphasis added).
35 The court is supported in this argument by the Supreme Court in
Fondren. "The argument is appealing, in so far as it seeks to avoid imputing
to Congress the intention to 'penalize gifts to minors merely because the legal
disability of their years precludes them for a time from receiving their income
in hand currently.'" Fondren v. Commissioner, 324 U.S. 18, 29 (1945)
(dictum).
36 Kieckhefer v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 118, 120 (7th Cir. 1951).
37 The court remarked that the Commissioner's argument as applied to
this case meant that the beneficiary must have the actual possession and use
of the gift in order for it to be a present interest. The court observed that
Congress did not intend that "the beneficiary [occupy] the same position
relative to the gift that a boy sustains to his top or a gift to her doll." Id. at
121.
38 "[N]o illustration is given as to how a gift of a present interest could
be made to a minor. . . ." Id.
39 It is important to distinguish "between restrictions and contingencies
imposed by the donor (in this case the trust instrument), and such restric-
tions and contingencies as are due to the disabilities always incident to and
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The Kieckhefer court hinted at a broad test. The source of the
restrictions should be ascertained if such restrictions upon present
enjoyment are found by the court. If the restrictions are not donor-
imposed, they should be disregarded.
It is important to observe the difference in approach taken by
the Tax Court and the Seventh Circuit. The Tax Court concerned
itself with the intent of the donor, and with the natural and legal
capacity of the donee to make an effective demand. It examined all
the surrounding circumstances and the trust document and concluded
that the demand provision, which purported to create a present inter-
est, was not likely to be exercised. The court found that there was to
be a certainty of postponed enjoyment at least in the nonlegal sense of
factually postponed economic benefit. The test adopted by the Tax
Court was a subjective one.
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit sought an objective test. It did
not attempt to ascertain either the intent of the donor or the prob-
ability of a demand being made. It confined its search to the trust
instrument and did not consider extrinsic facts and circumstances. 0
Ostensibly, the test sought was whether any legal rights to present
enjoyment were conveyed. The court mentioned that if this same
gift were made to an adult, present legal rights would have un-
questionably been conveyed.41 The court assumed, without discus-
sion, that the legal disability of the minor beneficiary prevented him
from making an effective legal demand. The court was unconcerned
with physical capacity, and indeed no mention was made of the age
of the donee. Still, the court was forced to the conclusion that no
present legal rights were conveyed by the donor, absent the appoint-
ment of a guardian. However, as this conclusion would mean dis-
crimination as to minors and would discourage gifts to minors,4 the
associated with minors. . . ." Id. at 122; accord, United States v. Baker, 236
F.2d 317 (4th Cir. 1956); Cannon v. Robertson, 98 F.Supp. 331 (W.D.N.C. 1951);
Beatrice B. Briggs, 34 T.C. 1132 (1960); see Gilmore v. Commissioner, 213 F.2d
520 (6th Cir. 1954); Commissioner v. Sharp, 153 F.2d 163 (9th Cir. 1946);
Strekalovsky v. Delaney, 78 F. Supp. 556 (D. Mass. 1948). See also Forbes,
Gifts to Minors, 19 MONT. L. REv. 106, 108 (1958).
40 See note 39 supra.
41 Kieckhefer v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 118, 121 (7th Cir. 1951).
42 It is submitted that this was the primary consideration of the ap-
pellate court. At that date few, if any, courts had held that a gift could be
made in trust which would qualify for the annual exclusion. The court was
clearly concerned with the detrimental effect that this might have on donors
who desired to give gifts to minors, and still provide for proper management
and control of the gift. Few donors would desire to give substantial gifts di-
rectly to a minor since he cannot be expected to possess the maturity and
judgment that is required for proper management and conservation of the
donated property. See note 38 supra.
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court was required to disregard the legal disabilities imposed by state
law.4
3
The Kieckhefer decision was something of a cause celebre and
was much noted.4 4 While the decision generated considerable excite-
ment, it was not subsequently followed by the Tax Court, and, un-
doubtedly, there were more than a few disappointed taxpayers.
The Stifel Decisions
In Arthur C. Stifel, Jr.45 the courts were presented with a prob-
lem very similar to that faced in Kieckhefer. While there were
certain factual differences, 46 both cases turned on the effect to be
given to the demand provision. The Tax Court reiterated its position
in John W. Kieckhefer and again considered all the surrounding
circumstances. It found that the donor intended that no demand was
to be made except in unusual circumstances. Absent the appointment
of a guardian there was no one who could make an effective demand,
and, therefore, the gift was held to be a future interest.
The Second Circuit affirmed the decision of the Tax Court, saying:
It is urged that neither the Tax Court nor we may properly consider
these items, since they involve restrictions not contained in the trust
43 Kieckhefer v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 118, 122 (7th Cir. 1951). The
Ninth Circuit, in Crummey, noticed this, saying, "The court [in Kieckhefer]
equated a present interest with a present right to possess, use or enjoy. The
facts of the case and the court's reasoning, however, indicate that it was
really equating a present interest with a present right to possess, use or enjoy
except for the fact that the beneficiary was a minor .... [A third] pos-
sibility is that the court should determine whether the donee is legally and
technically capable of immediately enjoying the property... [T]he ques-
tion would be whether the donee could possibly gain immediate enjoyment
and the emphasis would be on the trust instrument and the laws of the juris-
diction as to minors." Crummey v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 82, 86 (9th Cir.
1968). It is submitted that the "third possibility," i.e., whether the minor was
legally and technically capable of immediately enjoying the property, was the
test sought by the appellate court in Kieckhefer. See text accompanying notes
40-43 supra. However, as the court in Crummey read Kieckhefer, it thought
that the test enunciated by that court was that "postponed enjoyment is not
equivalent to a 'future interest' if the postponement is solely caused by the
minority of the beneficiary." Crummey v. Commissioner, supra at 88 (empha-
sis added). Therefore, the Ninth Circuit distinguished Kieckhefer on the
ground that failure to make a timely demand would also cause postponed
enjoyment in the Crummey trust. Therefore, the minority of the donee might
not be the sole cause for postponed enjoyment.
44 See, e.g., Rogers, Stifel Stifles Kieckhefer, 7 TAx. L. REv. 500 (1952);
65 HARv. L. REv. 703 (1952); 36 MrN. L. REv. 295 (1952).
45 17 T.C. 647 (1951).
46 One of the major differences was that in Kieckhefer the income was
to be accumulated subject to a demand, while in Stifel the income was to
be paid out as earned either to the beneficiary, guardian, if any, or the
donee's parent.
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instrument.... But in Fondren . .. the Supreme Court, in deter-
mining the nature of the rights conferred by the trust instruments,
took account of "surrounding circumstances"; the Court, in reaching
its determinations, did not irrevocably lock itself inside the "four
corners" of the writings but held that the key might lie outside. Were
this not the rule, a donor could make gifts which on paper were 100%
present but in practice were 100% future.47
The court depreciated the stated fear that no gifts could be made to
minors that would qualify for the annual exclusion.4 8 The court also
agreed with the Tax Court that without the appointment of a legal
guardian no one existed who could make an effective demand.4 9
Thus the lines were drawn. The Kieckhefer court supported a
purely objective approach, while Stifel spoke for a subjective test.5 °
Both courts of appeals claimed to rely on the Fondren decision, yet
each reached a different conclusion when faced with essentially the
same factual situation. As previously indicated, the conflict was
caused by the latent ambiguity in the Fondren test.51 However,
until the Ninth Circuit decided Crummey, no court had clearly
identified the conflict and sought to make a rational choice between
the opposing points of view.
The Crummey Decision
In Crummey, Judge Byrne, writing for the Ninth Circuit, re-
jected the test announced by Stifel. He regarded a subjective test as
untenable because "the solution suggested by that case is inconsistent
and unfair. It becomes arbitrary for the I.R.S. to step in and decide
who is likely to make an effective demand ... .-52 and who is not.
47 Stifel v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 1952).
48 "We believe that this view under-estimates the traditional judicial
knack of line-drawing." Id.
49 It is not clear whether the donee's interest would have been consid-
ered a present interest even if a guardian had been appointed. The intimation
in the court's opinion to this effect is qualified by a footnote: "It would
then seem to be proper to consider the actual facts as to the father's influ-
ence on the guardian appointed." Id. at 110 n.5; see Note, Gifts to Minors as
Present Interests for Purposes of the Annual Exclusion of the Federal Gift
Tax, 53 COLUm. L. REV. 530 (1953).
50 It is unclear whether the court adopted a purely subjective test or
whether it assumed that both substantive and legal barriers must not be pres-
ent in order to find a gift of a present interest. It appears that this court
thought that the disabilities of minority, both natural and legal, precluded the
beneficiary from making a demand. No indication was given as to what the
decision would have been had there been no legal barriers, but only a bar-
rier in the nonlegal sense of factually postponed economic benefit. It is
submitted that the decision would have been the same, since the Second
Circuit considered all surrounding circumstances.
51 See text accompanying notes 27-28 supra.
52 Crummey v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 82, 88 (9th Cir. 1968).
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The Tax Court in Stifel considered the intent of the donor and the
financial circumstances of those responsible for the support of the
minor beneficiary in order to discover the likelihood that a demand
would be made.53 The Ninth Circuit rejected such considerations. 4
The criticism of Judge Byrne is partially supported by the Supreme
Court: "So far as the argument turns on the motive of the donors,
it may be answered that the statute and the regulations make no
such test."55
Judge Byrne reviewed several other cases. Each cited different
language, but all relied on the Kieckhefer decision. Gilmore v.
Commissioner5 involved a demand provision.57 The Tax Court
thought that such a provision might create a present interest in the
donee if it were unrestricted, 58 but thought that other provisions
in the trust agreement were operative to restrict the application of the
demand provision. The Sixth Circuit reversed the Tax Court, hold-
ing that the demand provision was unrestricted.5 9 The court cited
the general "right to enjoy" 0 language of Kieckhefer in finding that
the gift was a present interest.6 1
In United States v. Baker"2 the Fourth Circuit, placing reliance on
Kieckhefer, held that a gift in trust to a minor where the trust agree-
ment directed the trustee to act as if he were the legal guardian of
the minor was a gift of a present interest. The court relied on the
"source of the restriction '6 3 doctrine suggested by Kieckhefer, and
53 Arthur C. Stifel, Jr., 17 T.C. 647 (1951).
54 Crummey v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 82, 88 (9th Cir. 1968).
5 Fondren v. Commsisioner, 324 U.S. 18, 28 (1945). The court adds, "If
motive has a bearing, it is only by reason of its effect upon the element of
time and whatever relation may be given, by the particular terms of the
gift, to it and the disclosing of a purpose to provide for or against immediate
enjoyment." Id. Other authorities have criticized a subjective test. See,
e.g., Rogers, Stifel Stifles Kieckhefer, 7 TAx. L. REv. 500, 501-02 (1952).
56 213 F.2d 520 (6th Cir. 1954).
57 The demand could only be made by the named beneficiary. No
provision was made for exercise by a legal guardian.
58 The Tax Court intimated that it did not think that the lack of a
guardian required a finding that the gift was one of a future interest. This
retreat from the Stifel position, however, was only temporary. See note 67
infra.
59 Gilmore v. Commissioner, 213 F.2d 520 (6th Cir. 1954).
0 "It is the right given to the donee, in the trust instrument, to use,
possess, or enjoy, and not the capacity of the donee, which determines
whether the gift is one of a present or future interest." Id. at 522.
61 The court also alluded to the broader rule suggested by Kieckhefer.
"The fact that there may not be income ... is not a contingency imposed by
the donor." Id. This appears to be another application of the source of the
restriction doctrine. See note 39 supra.
62 236 F.2d 317 (4th Cir. 1956).
03 "The trust agreement . . . created no barriers to the present enjoy-
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also analogized the case to a situation where a legal guardian had
been appointed and the gift had been made directly to him.14
Another case examined by the appellate court in Crummey was
George W. Perkins.6 5 In this case the Tax Court held that a demand
provision which was worded to give the beneficiary's parent the power
to demand created a present interest.0 6 The addition of the parent as
one having the right to make the demand was crucial. Had the parent
not possessed that power the court would have held the gift to be of a
future interest in accordance with one aspect of Stiel.
67
Analysis by the Ninth Circuit
In reviewing these cases, the Ninth Circuit determined that the
basis of Baker, Gilmore, and Perkins was the objective test sought
ment by the infants of the trust fund beyond those which are established by
the laws of North Carolina." Id. at 320.
64 "These gifts to a trustee, since they conferred on the beneficiaries
the same right to present enjoyment which they would have had if the gifts
[were] made to a guardian for them, must be judged by the same standard as
that applied to gifts made to a guardian." Id. It has been settled that a gift
made to a guardian for the benefit of the minor is a present interest and
the donor is entitled to the annual exclusion. See note 19 supra. The
Commissioner acquiesced in the Baker decision. Rev. Rul. 59-78, 1959-1
CuM. BULL. 690.
65 27 T.C. 601 (1956).
66 It is important to note that the parent was not the settlor of the
trust in this case. In deciding Crummey, the Tax Court said that this was
crucial to the holding, and the result would have been contra had the parent
been the donor. D. Clifford Crummey, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 772, 776 (1966).
67 "Had the power to demand ... been limited to the beneficiaries or
their duly appointed guardians.., there would have been ... no person who
could make an effective demand .... " George W. Perkins, 27 T.C. 601, 605
(1956). Note that the Tax Court rejects the intimation in Gilmore and retreats
to its previous provision. However, here the court interpreted Stifel as
requiring only the appointment of a guardian. The court retreats from other
aspects of the subjective test. The court did not concern itself with the prob-
ability of a demand being made. "Petitioners . . . did not anticipate ...
exercise... of that power [the demand power]. But we do not agree ...
that such expectation is more than precatory, or that it vitiates the clear right
unmistakably given.... Respondent has cited no authority, and we know of
none, that a demand by the parents could properly have been resisted." Id.
at 605. The court continued, "the existence or nonexistence of [the right to
demand] at the relevant time must determine the nature of the gifts, not
the subsequent conduct of the parents in choosing whether or not to exercise
it." Id. at 606.
Thus in Perkins, the Tax Court adopts the right to enjoy test, and rejects
the surrounding circumstances test of Stifel. However, the Stifel view re-
quiring someone to exercise the demand at the time when the gift is made is
reaffirmed.
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by the Kieckhefer court.68 The test there sought was whether the
beneficiary was legally and technically capable of immediately en-
joying the property. This is basically the test applied in Crummey
although the court focused its attention upon the laws of the juris-
diction as to minors as well as the trust instrument.
On the surface it would appear that the Ninth Circuit merely
adopted the general theory first advanced by the Seventh Circuit in
Kieckhefer. However, careful scrutiny reveals that the decision is
much more significant than that. It is submitted that this is
the first court to identify clearly the available alternatives and to
make a consciously reasoned selection. But most important, it is
the first court to challenge the implicit assumption made by the other
courts that the disabilities of minority preclude a minor beneficiary
from acquiring present legal rights. The court concluded that a minor
could make an effective demand even without the appointment of a
legal guardian.6 9
This conclusion was reached after an examination of California
law.70 It was based upon the minor's right to own property in Cali-
fornia. That a minor could not sue in his own name, or appoint an
agent, went only to the issue of whether a demand could be enforced.
However, the effect of the demand was not vitiated. For the trustee
to ignore the demand would be for him to commit a breach of trust.
7 1
The trustee would not be required-to deliver up the property to the
minor, but it would be the obligation of the trustee and not that of
the minor to secure the appointment of a guardian who would re-
ceive the property.
7 2
In devising its test, the Ninth Circuit has evidently overlooked
68 "This theory appears to be the basis of decision in George W. Perkins
.... This approach also seems to be the basis of the 'right to enjoy'
language both in Kieckhefer and Gilmore." Crummey v. Commissioner, 397
F.2d 82, 86 (9th Cir. 1968). See text accompanying note 34 supra.
69 "(W~e do not feel that a lawsuit or the appointment of an agent is a
necessary prelude to the making of a demand upon the trustee." Crummey v.
Commissioner, 397 F.2d 82, 87 (9th Cir. 1968).
70 In California a minor can own property. Estate of Yano, 188 Cal.
645, 206 P. 995 (1922). He is capable of demanding his funds from a bank,
CAL. Fnv. CODE §§ 850, 853, or a savings and loan association, CAL. Fnq. CODE
§§ 7600, 7606. A minor may not sue in his own name. CAL. CIv. CoDE § 42.
71 "The only time when the disability to sue would come into play,
would be if the trustee disregarded the demand and committed a breach of
trust. That would not, however, vitiate the demand." 397 F.2d 82, 87 (9th
Cir. 1968).
72 "As we visualize the hypothetical situation, the child would inform
the trustee that he demanded his share of the additions up to $4,000. The
trustee would petition the court for the appointment of a legal guardian and
then turn the funds over to the guardian." Id.
March 19691 TAXATION 1125
1126 THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20
the decision of the Supreme Court in United States v. Pelzer.73 In
that case it was held that the determination of whether a gift is one
of a present interest or a future interest could not be subject to the
vagaries of local law.74  This holding would appear to contradict
directly the test adopted in the Crummey case. However, it is
asserted that it does not.
Since the basis of the conclusion in Crummey is the right of a
minor to own property under state law, then, in any state where a
minor can own property, the minor must be deemed to have the
power to make an effective legal demand. A minor has the right to
own property in every state;75 and, therefore, an unrestricted de-
mand provision should yield a present interest in any state provided
an objective test is used to determine the nature of the interest con-
veyed. However, this analysis requires further examination.
The Subjective Test
Even if an adequate objective test can be developed, is such a
test preferable to a subjective one? The use of a subjective test has
mustered strong support. In Stifel Judge Franks pointed out that
where an examination is limited to objective considerations, it may
be possible to create rights which are wholly illusory. In his view,
extrinsic evidence may reveal the true nature of the interest con-
veyed.76
Consideration of all surrounding circumstances is required by
the test adopted in Stifel by the Second Circuit.77  The court was
concerned with postponed enjoyment in the nonlegal sense of factually
73 312 U.S. 399 (1941).
74 "Respondent ... insists that the gifts to the named grandchildren
are present, not future, interests as defined by Alabama law. He argues that,
as [NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2503(b)] does not define the 'future interests'
gifts which are excluded from its benefits, they must be taken to be future
interests as defined by local law, and it is the local law definition of future
interests which must be adopted in applying the section. But as we have
often had occasion to point out, the revenue laws are to be construed in the
light of their general purpose to establish a nationwide scheme of taxation
uniform in its application. Hence their provisions are not to be taken as
subject to state control or limitation unless the language or necessary impli-
cation of the section involved makes its application dependent on state law.
"We find no such implication in the exclusion of gifts of 'future inter-
ests' from the benefits given by [§ 2503(b) supra] .... It is plainly not
concerned with the varying local definitions .... " United States v. Pelzer,
312 U.S. 399, 402 (1941).
75 "The bare fact of infancy constitutes no barrier to the acquisition and
ownership of land." 1 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 125 (1949).
76 Stifel v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 1952).
77 Id.
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postponed economic benefit. It is apparent that the court arrived at
a literal interpretation of the statutes. The Supreme Court has often
observed that in the application of the revenue laws, the substance
and not the form of a transaction should control.78  The application
of this view is manifest in the decision of the Second Circuit.
The problem with applying a subjective test is that, as was
pointed out by Judge Byrne in Crummey, it may be applied arbi-
trarily.7 9 No guidelines are provided by this approach, and the
taxpayer is left to the undefined judgment of either a court or the
IRS. Where the IRS is to be the initial arbiter, the courts are often
cautious. They are reluctant to allow the Service free rein to make
subjective determinations. Guidelines must be provided that will
enable effective judicial review of administrative determinations.
The substitution of the judgment of a court for the judgment of an
administrative official is not satisfactory unless such guidelines exist;
otherwise, litigation is encouraged.80
In addition to the criticism of inviting repetitious litigation, the
use of a subjective test is open to another criticism. It has yet to
be contended that actual physical possession and use of a gift is re-
quired in order to find that the donee has acquired a present interest.
All that is required is the right to such actual use and possession.
However, actual use and possession is seemingly the basis for the
subjective test propounded by the Tax Court and the Second Cir-
cuit. These courts, in attempting to determine the likelihood that a
demand would be made, were, in effect, determining the probability
that the donee would acquire actual use and possession.
Furthermore, the elements of the subjective test as applied by
these courts are subject to question. A consideration of the physical
capabilities of the beneficiary can lead to no useful conclusion. It
may be necessary and even desirable to distinguish between adults
and minors with regard to the gift tax, but to discriminate further
among minors on the basis of their natural capacities seems unjust.8'
If such distinctions are to be maintained, even the Second Circuit's
78 Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
7) 397 F.2d at 88.
80 "Every fact-situation will differ from every other; there will be
continued hair-splitting over insignificant differences in the phraseology of the
instruments; and if the phrase is ambiguous, hairs may be re-split over
nuances of extrinsic testimony." Rogers, Stifel Stifles Kieckhefer, 7 TAX. L.
REv. 500, 503 (1952).
81 After all, there is in fact discrimination between adults and minors.
Competent adults are not required to have others appointed to manage their
property and affairs. There is legislative and judicial recognition of the dif-
ferences between adults and minors. However, it does not follow that such
distinctions were intended in the application of the revenue laws, absent spe-
cific congressional instructions to that effect.
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judicial knack for drawing fine lines will be somewhat strained.82
For instance, how does one explain that a demand provision in a
trust created for the benefit of a precocious child conveys a present
interest while the identical trust conveys a future interest to the
average child?
8
Another factor considered by those courts that have applied a
broad subjective test is the foreseeable fiscal requirements of the
beneficiary.8 4 In the absence of congressional mandate, the courts
should not discriminate on the basis of the financial circumstances
of the parties in interest. Yet the Tax Court and the Second Circuit
considered the financial circumstances of the parents in reaching the
conclusion that a demand was improbable.
It also seems incongruous to hold the gift to be of a future interest
because no guardian had been appointed. Assuming, arguendo, that
the minor is incapable of making an effective demand, the fact that a
guardian is not in existence at the time of the gift is not significant.
Even if a guardian had been appointed, the use, possession or enjoy-
ment of the property would fall to the minor only in such amounts
and at such times as the guardian might deem proper. Such re-
strictions on the right of enjoyment have been ignored by the courts
in other circumstances, and there do not seem to be strong reasons
for raising such considerations in this context.8
There is an additional hiatus in a probability of demand test.
Judge Byrne in Crummey noted that it was probable that the bene-
ficiaries did not even know of the existence of the trust, much less
have knowledge of their power to demand sums from it.86 In these
circumstances the probability that a demand will be made is almost
zero. Should this lack of knowledge be construed as requiring a
holding that the gift is of a future interest? Clearly this would be
inconsistent. A minor is equally unlikely to have knowledge of a gift
being given directly to his legal guardian, and such a gift is deemed
to be of a present interest. A different conclusion does not seem
82 Stifel v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 1952).
83 Randolph Paul doubts that Congress established such excessively fine
distinctions which are carefully graded according to the age of the bene-
ficiary. R. PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFT TAXATION (Supp. 1946).
84 E.g., John W. Kieckhefer, 15 T.C. 111, 114 (1950).
85 It is not disputed that the relationship of parent and child is one which
permits the parent to have considerable influence over his child. The parent
may properly exercise his authority to prevent a child from making actual
use of a gift. Yet no one contends that this exercise of authority converts a
present interest into a future one.
86 "As a practical matter, it is likely that some, if not all, of the bene-
ficiaries did not even know that they had any right to demand funds from
the trust." 397 F.2d at 88.
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called for because the gift is given to a trustee. There is no basis
for distinguishing between these two fiduciaries in this context.
It is submitted that the subjective test has little to recommend
it. A strict construction of the statute and regulations will lead to
a finding that any postponed enjoyment in reality leads to a denial of
the annual exclusion and the treasury might be slightly more sol-
vent.87 It is not likely that Congress intended this result when the
code provision was adopted. Congress does not appear to desire to
discourage gifts being given to minors.88 It is recognized that the
natural and legal disabilities of minority provide sufficient reason
for the refusal to give substantial donations directly to a minor. In
order to assure that the property will be properly managed and con-
served, it is now established that gifts to custodians, guardians, and
trustees are appropriate methods for making such donations. Those
who make use of the trust should not be penalized by the appli-
cation of an increased tax unless it is clear that Congress intends
this result.
The Objective Test
The establishment of an objective test for the determination of
the status of a gift provision as a present or future interest must offer
guidance to the taxpayer, yet must not encourage efforts to circum-
vent taxation by the creation of illusory interests. Such a test has
been sought by many courts.89 The Supreme Court stated in Fon-
dren that in the search for an ownership equivalent the right to
enjoy should be the criterion for such a determination. 90 An objective
test may be developed which conforms to this proposition.
It is submitted that the gift should be deemed to be of a future
interest if, and only if, there are donor-imposed legal restrictions upon
the right to present enjoyment.
When there are legal restrictions on a gift it may be of a future
87 Even this has been effectively challenged. It has been noted that the
costs of litigation probably exceed the revenues received from the taxation of
gifts which are deemed to be of future interests. Rogers, Stifel Stifles
Kieckhefer, 7 TAX. L. REv. 500, 503 (1952).
88 This is to be inferred from the passage of section 2503 (c) of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code of 1954. This section permits the exclusion to a donor upon
compliance with the requirements of that section. No determination of whether
the interest is future or present is required. The service has refused to apply
the maxim of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius-the
expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. Therefore, the exclusion
is still available without compliance with these statutory requirements if the
future interest hurdle can be overcome. Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-4(c) (1958).
89 E.g., Kieckhefer v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 118 (7th Cir. 1951).
90 Fondren v. Commissioner, 324 U.S. 18, 20 (1945).
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interest. It seems appropriate, therefore, that the courts' attention
should be directed initially to the trust document. Any restrictions
emanating from that source must of necessity be donor-imposed and
the gift should be deemed to be one of a future interest. It is possible
that legal restrictions may exist which are not contained in the trust
instrument.91 If these are found, then the source of these restrictions
must be ascertained. Nondonor-imposed restrictions should be dis-
regarded and the gift found to be of a present interest. If the restric-
tions are established by the donor, a contrary finding is required.
The Ninth Circuit in Crummey has properly concluded that a
demand provision may suffice to convey present legal rights of enjoy-
ment to the donee. This is true of a demand provision that is un-
restricted in form and application. However, as inferred by the Tax
Court in Gilmore, it is possible to include a demand provision in a
trust and then restrict its application so that it may not be effectively
ekercised. 92  If such restrictions operate on the demand provision
the gift should be deemed to be of a future interest. An application
of this proposed test to the facts of the Crummey case would yield a
result contrary to the holding of the Ninth Circuit.
An unrestricted power to demand all or part of the trust estate
will require a finding that the gift conveyed was of a present in-
terest. However, in the instant case the power to demand was not
unrestricted. The power was to expire by its own terms on December
3.1 of any year in which a gift to the trust was made.93 Upon the
expiration of the power to demand, the property was irretrievably
beyond the dominion of the beneficiary. He no longer had a right
to enjoy the property. It is submitted that the interest created was
clearly illusory.94  The "present right of enjoyment" given to the
beneficiary was not of sufficient duration to be considered un-
restricted. The restriction was donor-imposed and contained in the
trust agreement. It is suggested that this situation is one to which
the Second Circuit referred when it expressed its concern about the
possibility of creating sham interests which would pass the present
interest hurdle in form but not in fact.95
91 This writer cannot conceive of how a restriction on a present right
of.use, possession or enjoyment could be imposed outside of the trust instru-
ment. However, this does not presuppose that such a possibility is nonex-
istent.
92 Genevieve v. Gilmore, 20 T.C. 579, 583 (1953).
93 See note 4 supra.
94 Had the gifts been given at one minute before midnight on December
31, the power to demand would have had a total life of only one minute. In
the instant case the actual duration of the power was some two weeks, but
a different conclusion does not seem called for.
95 Stifel v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 1952).
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The Ninth Circuit appears to have been aware of the limited
duration of the demand power. However, it considered the limitation
as going only to the issue of the probability that a demand would
be made.9 6 It is submitted, however, that there is a clear conceptual
distinction between an existent power which may or may not be
exercised at the will of the donee, and a power which terminates
and can never thereafter be exercised. The proposed objective test
would require judicial notice of these and similar donor-imposed re-
strictions.
A final caveat is in order. While an objective test is obviously
to be preferred, no court may close its eyes to subjective consider-
ations. The taxpayer is ingenious. It is possible that extrinsic factors
may exist in some situations which will enable the donor to create
the appearance of a gift of a present interest which will in fact be
100 percent future. The courts should not blind themselves to these
possibilities in the name of applying an objective test. Experience
has shown that a mechanical test cannot be relied upon to produce a
proper result in all situations.
9 7
In applying Crummey or the proposed test derived from the
Ninth Circuit's reasoning, no court should be unaware of these possi-
bilities.
Realities
Whether the decision in Crummey was correct or incorrect in
the circumstances is obviously subject to some dispute. However, it
cannot be disputed that in Crummey the Ninth Circuit joins the
Seventh, Sixth, and Fourth Circuits in adopting a liberal interpre-
tation of the future interest rule. While it is not recommended
that Crummey be relied upon to produce the same result in other
circuits when a demand provision which is so limited is inserted in a
trust instrument, it seems safe to conclude that an unrestricted de-
mand provision will yield a finding of a present interest in any of
these circuits, and the donor will be permitted an annual exclusion
for the gift.
Thus the demand provision can be a useful tool to the taxplanner.
In these four circuits it is now possible to establish accumulation
trusts for minors and still obtain an annual exclusion for the donor.
M.P.W.
96 397 F.2d at 88.
97 The fate of the stop, look and listen test proposed by Justice Holmes
in Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927), is instructive. See
Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 292 U.S. 98 (1934).
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